Welcome to 2026. The world in which we live has never been more complex and global events seem to change by the moment. That’s why I’ve taken a few days to ponder the arrest of Nicolas Maduro and have waited to comment on it until I had a good feel for what’s going on and how we should be thinking about the next phase.
Hot takes during complex international crises have their place, but often they can cement our analysis prematurely and prevent us from being flexible and open to new ideas. That’s the tack I’m taking right now.
I’ve spent a career in foreign affairs, with most of my professional work focused on the Middle East and Europe. But this is not where I started my career. Instead, I started it in Latin America as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Costa Rica. Those two years exposed me to the region, its culture, its people, and its history, providing me with a layer of empathy towards the region that I carry with me daily. It is a wonderful part of the world.
And that’s why I’m cautious about describing what this moment means. There are multiple historic trends coming in to play right now, and this is a region that rightly fears unbridled military power being waged against it. It’s also a region starving for democracy, a region that needs support and development to thrive, and a region that’s a natural ally of the United States.
And with that, here’s my take on Venezuela:
Maduro Is Arrested. Now Comes the Hard Part.
The arrest of Nicolás Maduro is one of those rare geopolitical moments that feels both surreal and overdue. After years of repression, corruption, and the hollowing out of a once-prosperous country, accountability has finally caught up with the man who presided over Venezuela’s collapse.
But before Washington congratulates itself, we need to pause - and listen.
For Latin Americans, this moment is fraught with memory. The region has lived through decades in which U.S. power was often exercised bluntly: Cold War–era interventions, support for coups dressed up as stability, economic pressure applied with little regard for social cost, and transitions promised but never fully supported. As a result, a legacy of regional anger and distrust towards the U.S. persists.
That history hasn’t faded. It shapes how this moment will be received in Caracas, Bogotá, Brasília, and beyond.
Which is why the worst mistake we could make now is to play the role of the “ugly American” — loud, self-congratulatory, and impatient. Venezuela’s future does not belong to Washington, nor to any outside capital eager to claim credit. It belongs to the Venezuelan people. Full stop.
Our responsibility therefore is not to dictate outcomes, but to support democratic processes with humility, legality, and staying power. That means resisting the urge to declare victory early, resisting the temptation to treat leadership change as an endpoint, resisting the desire to take the country’s natural resources all for ourselves, and resisting the idea that external pressure alone can substitute for legitimate governance.
We’ve seen this movie before, not just in Latin America, but in Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan too. Removing a strongman is often the easiest part. Remember when President Bush declared “mission accomplished” only weeks after invading Iraq? We didn’t end our heavy military involvement there for another 15 years!
So what follows now is the real test of seriousness, discipline, and international coordination. If we get the next phase, also known as the Day After, wrong, Maduro’s arrest could become less a triumph of justice and more a reminder of how quickly opportunity can curdle into instability.
So rather than spike the football, it’s time for a clear-eyed checklist on the way forward. We don’t have that yet from President Trump and this is where Congress, particularly Democrats, should weigh in, as they should aggressively attempt to shape the contours of the Day After, lest we drift into a foreign policy abyss of our own making. Here’s what they should focus on to get there:
1. Oil
Oil has always distorted Venezuela’s politics — and it has too often distorted international engagement with the country as well. And now President Trump has put it at the top of the list of why we intervened (eschewing his counter-narcotics rhetoric of the past several months).
The region has long seen moments where democratic aspirations were subordinated to energy interests, reinforcing the belief that principles in Washington are conditional when resources are at stake. If oil becomes the driving force of the post-Maduro phase, that perception will harden overnight. We must resist this temptation.
Reintegrating Venezuelan oil into global markets may be economically valuable and strategically useful, but it must be done carefully and conditionally. Transparency, revenue oversight, anti-corruption mechanisms, and the proper role of the U.S. military in providing security cannot be afterthoughts. They are the policy.
If Venezuelans see oil revenues once again captured by elites — domestic or foreign — the transition to a post-Maduro world will lose legitimacy fast. And on a practical level, we need that legitimacy, as Venezuelans will ultimately govern their own country and we want them to find it politically viable to work with us.
Oil can support recovery. It cannot be allowed to define it.
2. Regional Stability
Venezuela’s collapse didn’t happen in isolation, and neither will its recovery. Neighboring countries have spent years absorbing the consequences of failed governance in Caracas — from mass migration to border insecurity to armed militias to political polarization driven by refugee flows. That reality shapes how this moment will be judged across the region.
Here’s where historical memory matters. Latin America has seen transitions derailed before when outside powers treated regional stability as an afterthought or assumed it would “sort itself out” once a strongman was gone. That approach bred resentment, guerrilla movements, rebellions, violent human-rights abusing dictatorships, and of course, a deep skepticism of foreign promises.
If we want this moment to hold, regional diplomacy must be steady, consultative, and respectful. Colombia, Brazil, Central American and Caribbean nations are not bystanders; they are stakeholders. Working with them — rather than presenting faits accomplis — is essential to preventing spillover instability and rebuilding trust that has too often been eroded by past U.S. overreach or neglect. This is how we will leverage this moment to grow, rather than shrink, our influence.
Stability here won’t come from dominance or diktat. It will come from coordination, patience, and an understanding that Latin America remembers who showed up as a partner — and who didn’t.
3. Drug Trafficking
Latin America has lived through decades of externally driven counter-narcotics campaigns that emphasized force over governance, often leaving violence and weakened institutions in their wake. That history looms large, and it should inform what comes next.
Venezuela’s role in narco-trafficking emerged from multiple factors - some of which will be exposed during Maduro’s trial in New York - as well as broader institutional collapse, corruption, and economic incentives to meet massive global - including American - demand for drugs. Drug networks have exploited these conditions ruthlessly and it’s completely unclear if countering this scourge is still a priority for the Trump team — or if it was just being used as a convenient argument to pressure Maduro.
So if we are going to truly counter the drug trade, the effort must focus on rebuilding law enforcement, judicial capacity, and financial transparency inside of Venezuela. Taking responsibility for the problem all by ourselves would likely just be militarizing our response to it - an inherently short term approach. We must get the new Venezuelan government to truly restore the rule of law and counter the drug flow. Otherwise, we won’t succeed. But for now, this seems like a distant dream, as Maduro’s regime is essentially still in place… leading me to:
4. Venezuelan Democracy and Governance
This is the heart of the matter and one that the Trump team has consistently sidestepped. But it’s essential to enabling a long term strategy for Venezuela that actually succeeds in achieving its goals.
Optimistically, there are shoots of democracy in Venezuela for the taking. Maria Corina Machado’s allies in the country won the election in 2024 and Venezuela has historically had a sound democratic system, prior to the rise of Chavez (who paradoxically was elected to power). It’s entirely realistic to leverage these assets to get new governance structures - that ally with the United States - in place. But we have to make this a priority.
We must also be mindful that democracy cannot be air-dropped. Yet it can also not be ignored. This is the realist approach peppered with hefty humility. Latin America has endured too many “transitions” that prioritized speed over legitimacy, producing hollow institutions that collapsed under pressure. That appears to be the road we’re currently on, and we shouldn’t be. We must start by demanding democratic governance from new Acting President Delcy Rodriguez. We currently are not, and we must reverse this position.
5. Global Competitors: Russia, China, and Iran
Russia, China, and Iran are watching this moment closely — not because they care about Venezuelan democracy, but because they care the potential loss of their client state and its concomitant impact on their influence. Each has invested in Maduro precisely because he was an adversary of the U.S.; they are watching what happens next - i.e. will his regime persist or will it turn towards the U.S.? - very closely.
But we must avoid the trap of turning Venezuela into another arena for great-power chest-thumping. Doing so would undermine our influence.
This is because Latin America has long rejected being treated as a geopolitical chessboard, whether during the Cold War or today. When outside powers frame the region primarily through the lens of competition — rather than sovereignty and self-determination — they reinforce the very resentments that rivals like Moscow and Beijing are eager to exploit. We do not want to counterproductively drive Latin American nations into our adversaries’ arms out of fear of the United States.
We must therefore pivot towards building up Venezuela as a new American ally with legitimacy amongst the Venezuelan people to truly gain an advantage against our global rivals. If the post-Maduro transition is perceived as externally manipulated or transactional, Russia, China, and Iran won’t need to intervene aggressively — skepticism will do the work for them.
But if it’s seen as legitimate, Venezuelan-led, and regionally supported, their influence will wither and both the Venezuelan people and the U.S. will gain.
The lesson of American foreign policy from the past decades is painfully clear: success is not defined by the fall of a dictator, but by what replaces them.
Maduro’s arrest is a reality that we cannot now change. But we can change what comes next, especially if we see this as a moment — a rare one — to deliver a new Venezuelan reality that provides for democratic renewal rather than prolonged instability. That is the choice before us and is not the current track we’re on, but one that Congress, in particular, should be shaping for the Trump team.
Remember: history does not care about Democrats or Republicans. It will view our actions as being done by Americans, and we as a country will be judged by whether Venezuela emerges freer, safer, and more democratic on the other side, or if it does not.
That’s the real test. And it’s only just begun.
